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Stewardship Codes and the Role of Institutional Investors in Corporate Governance: An 
International Comparison and Typology 
Abstract  
Over recent decades share-ownership of listed companies has concentrated into the hands of large 
institutional investors, challenging the traditional agency theory view of corporate governance as a 
mechanism to resolve the separation of ownership and control.  Alternative theories have emerged 
to explain the role of institutional investors in corporate governance, each with a slightly different 
view on the motivations of these powerful shareholders and the nature of their relationship with 
corporate management. These theories share a common thread - the concept of investor 
stewardship - yet each theory applies it differently.  This paper explores whether institutional 
investors should act primarily as stewards of their investee companies (agency theory), stewards of 
beneficiaries’ funds (agency capitalism), stewards of a market/economy (universal ownership) or 
stewards of society (stakeholder theory) and whether this varies internationally. Through an analysis 
of national stewardship codes, the paper determines which of these theoretical approaches are 
most strongly reflected in emerging stewardship policy across the world.  It presents a typology of 
stewardship codes as a framework for understanding cross-country variation in investor stewardship 
policy.  Stewardship codes influence the shareholder-manager relationship and can encourage 
integration of wider economic and societal concerns into corporate finance. 
Introduction  
The nature of share ownership has gone through significant changes over recent decades (De la Cruz 
et al., 2019; Fichtner et al., 2017; Hawley and Lukomnik, 2018; Kahle and Stulz, 2017).  The majority 
of listed shares have gone from being owned directly by individuals to being owned by large 
institutions such as pension funds, mutual funds, insurance companies and unit trusts (Bebchuk et 
al., 2017; Davis, 2008; De la Cruz et al., 2019; Jahnke, 2019; Ryan and Schneider, 2003).  At the end 
of 2017, institutional investors held 41% of global market capitalisation (De la Cruz et al., 2019). Not 
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only are stock markets dominated by institutional investors they are dominated by foreign 
institutional investors.  Figures released by the British Office of National Statistics show that in 2018 
approximately 54.9% of UK listed shares were owned by foreign investors (mostly institutional 
investors) and approximately 31.6% by domestic institutional investors (Office for National Statistics, 
2020).  These trends are not limited to Anglo-American corporate governance systems with most 
OECD countries showing an increase in inward foreign investment into equity markets over recent 
years (OECD, 2020). Overall there has been a huge concentration of share ownership into the hands 
of large globally-oriented institutional investors of the likes of Blackrock, State Street and Vanguard 
(Fichtner et al., 2017; Jahnke, 2019; Schmalz, 2018).  
The implications of these share ownership changes for models of corporate governance are under-
researched and poorly understood (Barker and Chiu, 2017; Gillan and Starks, 2003; Ryan and 
Schneider, 2003).  There is growing agreement that theories based on the Berle and Means concept 
of the separation of ownership and control in modern corporations (dispersed shareholders lacking 
power over their investments) are no longer as accurate or as helpful as they may have been 50 
years ago (Berle and Means, 1932; Fichtner et al., 2017; Gilson and Gordon, 2013).  The shareholder-
manager relationship, although still based on agency, has changed significantly in terms of power 
relations and investment motivations.  As the OECD stated in 2011, “the old question of shareholder 
oversight of company boards needs to be re-examined in this new context” (OECD, 2011: 10).   
It is time to re-think the role of the shareholder in corporate governance in light of both this re-
concentration of share ownership and also the growing variation amongst shareholders and their 
investment strategies (Çelik and Isaksson, 2014; Ryan and Schneider, 2003).  The shareholders of a 
publicly listed company, even those within the institutional investors category, are a heterogeneous 
and constantly changing group of investors with diverse motives, each providing different challenges 
for corporate governance (Aguilera et al., 2016; McCahery et al., 2016; McNulty and Nordberg, 2016; 
Ryan and Schneider, 2003).  Importantly, many shares are no longer held directly but are placed with 
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asset managers who act on behalf of the institutional investor to manage a portfolio of investments 
using a variety of different strategies (Hawley and Lukomnik, 2018; Jahnke, 2019).   
Thus, institutional investors have been found to behave both as watchdogs or enforcers of good 
corporate governance, using ‘voice’ to influence corporate behaviour; yet also as uninterested short-
term traders using ‘exit’ strategies to increase portfolio value (Edmans and Manso, 2011; Hendry et 
al. 2006; Hirschman, 1970; Tilba and McNulty, 2013; Tricker, 1998).  Research explaining this 
variation in behaviour and its impact on corporate management, is still in the early stages of 
development within the corporate governance literature (Fichtner et al., 2017; Goranova et al., 
2010; Johnson et al., 2010; McCahery et al., 2016; McNulty and Nordberg, 2016; Ryan and 
Schneider, 2002; Stathopoulos and Voulgaris, 2016; Tilba and McNulty, 2013).  New research 
questions and theories are emerging around the role of institutional investors in corporate 
governance. In what circumstances do they act as responsible long-term owners of shares or short-
term traders? (Jahnke, 2019; Otsuka, 2018; Tilba and McNulty, 2013)  Have they become so large 
and powerful to be seen as universal co-owners of the wider economy, (Hawley and Williams, 2002; 
Schmalz, 2018) or must they act as fiduciaries of specific assets (Sandberg, 2011)?   
While academics explore these issues, policy-makers worldwide are encouraging a role for 
institutional investors as responsible stewards through the introduction of stewardship codes.  
Stewardship codes are industry-led, soft regulation, directed at institutional investors and intended 
to resolve some of the tensions that the current situation presents (Cheffins, 2010).  As policy 
documents created by multi-stakeholder groups, stewardship codes are not only instrumentally 
rational (tools to achieve certain results) but are also expressive of meaning, including individual and 
collective identity (Yanow, 2000).  This makes them worthy of study as a new and fast-developing 
element of the institutional framework for corporate governance.   
Indeed, since the publication of the UK Stewardship Code in 2010, almost twenty other countries 
have published similar documents and it is highly likely that these stewardship codes will continue to 
5 
 
proliferate across the globe much like corporate governance codes have since the 1990s (Aguilera 
and Cuervo-Cazurra, 2009; Cuomo et al., 2016; Hill, 2017). Corporate governance codes have shaped 
the role of the board of directors over the last twenty years, (Aguilera, 2005; Haxhi and Aguilera, 
2012) and stewardship codes will likely do the same for the role of institutional investors.  
This paper aims to identify the collective interpretations of stewardship codes regarding the role of 
institutional investors, as well as any differences in interpretation. It explores which theoretical 
approaches are most strongly reflected in investor stewardship policy and how this varies across 
countries. As will be explored below, different corporate governance theories place different 
relationships at the core of stewardship.  Should investors act primarily as stewards of investee 
corporations (agency theory); stewards of beneficiaries’ funds (agency capitalism theory); stewards 
of a market or economy (universal ownership theory); or stewards of society (stakeholder theory)?  
The paper is structured as follows. First it reviews the literature on stewardship codes, comparative 
corporate governance and the role of institutional investors in corporate governance.  Due to the 
nature of the topic, the review is multidisciplinary incorporating scholarly work across the disciplines 
of management, law and finance.  It compares four theories (agency theory, agency capitalism, 
universal ownership and stakeholder theory) in terms of their implications for stewardship 
behaviour on the part of institutional investors. The next section presents the research methodology 
and findings based on qualitative analysis of nineteen national stewardship codes. The paper draws 
out commonalities amongst stewardship codes as well as cross-country differences. It presents a 
typology of stewardship codes based on their dominant theoretical underpinnings. Lastly, it makes 
suggestions for future research and draws out implications for management practice. 
Stewardship codes and comparative corporate governance  
The literature on stewardship codes (as opposed to corporate governance codes more generally) is 
small, recent and found primarily in the discipline of law.  Legal scholars have been interested in the 
regulatory nature of stewardship codes and whether they are likely to be effective (Cheffins, 2010; 
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Chiu, 2013; Hill, 2017; Klettner, 2017; Micheler, 2013; Reisberg, 2015; Roach, 2011; Wheeler, 2013).  
Early papers focused on the UK Stewardship Code, as the first of its kind. The code was introduced as 
part of corporate governance reforms recommended after the global financial crisis of 2008.  
Institutional investors were identified as culprits, ‘absentee landlords’ failing to do anything to 
monitor or control wayward executives, particularly in the finance sector (Cheffins, 2010: 1009; 
Roach, 2011).  The majority of scholars have been sceptical about the ability of stewardship codes to 
trigger significant changes in investor behaviour (Cheffins, 2010; Chiu, 2013; Reisberg, 2015; Roach, 
2011).  Most considered the initial UK code to be weak due to its limited coverage, (Cheffins, 2010); 
lack of enforceability (Reisberg, 2015); and the fact that it ignored many of the well know practical 
barriers to shareholder engagement (Chiu, 2013; Reisberg, 2015).  Despite these limitations, several 
scholars still conclude that stewardship codes have normative power and provide helpful 
foundations for change (Arsalidou, 2012; Chiu and Katelouzou, 2016).  Following the UK’s lead, many 
more countries have now adopted stewardship codes and this has permitted the emergence of early 
international comparative work in the literature.  This work examines the different narratives behind 
shareholder engagement across different countries and how these differences may impact on code 
effectiveness (Goto, 2018; Hill, 2017; Klettner, 2017). 
In the management literature, the emergence of stewardship codes has been noted within the 
broader literature on corporate governance codes (Cuomo et al., 2016). In contrast to the legal 
literature, the management literature does not focus on the implementation and effectiveness of 
codes but on trying to explain the reasons for code diffusion and variation, their implications for firm 
performance and whether they provide evidence of convergence of corporate governance towards a 
common model (Cuomo et al., 2016; Haxhi and Aguilera, 2012; Haxhi and Van Ees, 2010).  This paper 
joins the small number of studies that perform a comparative analysis of the content of different 
codes in order to better understand specific corporate governance mechanisms. For example, Collier 
and Zaman (2005a) compare the audit committee concept across 20 European codes; Cicon et al 
(2012) conduct a thematic analysis of the corporate governance codes of 23 European countries; 
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and Zattoni and Cuomo (2010) review the definition of an independent director across 44 codes. 
This paper conducts an analysis of 19 stewardship codes to explore the modern role of institutional 
investors in corporate governance and to compare its dominant theoretical underpinnings across 
countries.  
Stewardship codes and the role of institutional investors  
Moving away from the international comparative literature, stewardship codes have been noted by 
scholars studying the role of institutional investors in corporate governance, shareholder activism 
and different forms of corporate ownership (Aggarwal et al., 2011; McNulty and Nordberg, 2016).  
Theories about the role of investors in corporate governance, particularly institutional investors, are 
much less developed than those that look at the role of the board (Aguilera et al., 2015).  Indeed, 
other than recognising minority and majority stakes, legal models of corporate governance do not 
tend to distinguish between different types of investors, treating them all as shareholders with equal 
rights to participate in corporate governance but no responsibilities (Micheler, 2013). This paper 
explores the role of institutional investors as explained by four theories: agency theory, agency 
capitalism, universal ownership and stakeholder theory. As outlined below, each theory predicts 
different incentives for investors, different responsibilities in corporate governance and therefore 
different behavioural outcomes in terms of the shareholder-manager relationship.  These theories 
provide the conceptual framework for subsequent analysis of stewardship codes.   
Of course, stewardship theory must also be relevant when the word stewardship is so prominent in 
most stewardship codes.  Stewardship is defined by Hernandez as ‘the extent to which an individual 
willingly subjugates his or her personal interests to act in protection of others’ (Hernandez, 2008).  In 
corporate governance, stewardship theory has traditionally been applied at the managerial level to 
provide an alternative view to agency theory on the motivations of managers, arguing that they do 
not always act in a self-interested way, instead, many managers pursue collective benefit (Davis et 
al., 1997).  However, when applying this theory to institutional investors it is possible to take several 
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different approaches which align with the other four theories above.  As will be explored further 
below, the theoretical question becomes, to whom should institutional investors act as stewards?  
Are they expected to be stewards of their investee companies (agency theory); stewards of fund 
beneficiaries (agency capitalism); stewards of the wider economy (universal ownership); or of all 
interested stakeholders (stakeholder theory)?  It is perhaps the inherent conflicts in trying to act as 
stewards to all of these different parties that create practical tensions for institutional investors with 
regard to their role in corporate governance.   
Agency theory and agency capitalism 
Agency theory has been highly influential in understanding the shareholder-manager relationship as 
one of principal and agent (Fama and Jensen, 1983; Jensen and Meckling, 1976).  Agency theory 
tends to treat shareholders as a homogenous group interested in monitoring corporate 
management, through the board of directors, to ensure their financial interests are met (Gillan and 
Starks, 2003).  In this sense, they can be seen as willing stewards of the company who elect a board 
to help them monitor and control management to enhance corporate value for all shareholders. 
They implement stewardship through monitoring corporate performance, engaging with the board 
and voting at meetings (Bebchuk et al., 2017).  Yet empirical findings on the monitoring role of 
investors is somewhat mixed, “the incentive to monitor and the effectiveness of monitoring varies 
within the institutional investor community” (Gillan and Starks, 2003: 7). Keay found that most 
investors do not tend to monitor or engage on a regular basis, only sometimes as a reaction to 
unusually poor performance (Keay, 2014). This is because the cost of closely monitoring a huge 
portfolio of shares is high and investors may find it more efficient to reduce risk by selling low-
performing shares: the strategy of ‘exit’ rather than ‘voice’ (Hirschman, 1970; McNulty and 
Nordberg, 2016; Otsuka, 2018).  Indeed, a trading mentality rather than an owner mentality has 
been found to prevail amongst the large majority of institutional investors (Hendry et al. 2006; 
McNulty and Nordberg, 2016; Tilba and McNulty, 2013).  This trading mentality has been enabled by 
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technology and innovation as well as the ongoing financialisation of the economy.  In particular, 
hedge funds, index-funds, securitisation and derivatives markets have changed the nature and 
purpose of share ownership, creating long investment chains that distance the investor from the 
equities that underlie their investment (Kay, 2012: 30).  The consequences of this new environment 
are helpfully explained by emerging theories of agency or financier capitalism  (Barker and Chiu, 
2017; Davis, 2008; Gilson and Gordon, 2013) also known as fiduciary or investor capitalism (Hawley 
and Williams, 2000b; Useem, 1996).   
Agency capitalism recognises that new agency relationships found along the investment chain, for 
example between institutional investors and their fund beneficiaries, and between asset owners and 
the asset managers that they employ, may pose more of an agency problem for modern corporate 
governance than the traditional manager-shareholder relationship (Gilson and Gordon, 2013).  In 
fact, these agency relationships can explain the lack of monitoring of corporate management as they 
reduce the incentives and competence of investment intermediaries to engage with companies and 
make them more likely to use exit rather than voice (Barker and Chiu, 2017; Gilson and Gordon, 
2013).  Agency capitalism places institutional investors primarily as stewards of funds. Thus, to 
protect and grow those funds, they may choose strategies based on modern portfolio theory rather 
than active ownership of individual companies.  Figure 1 compares the traditional agency theory 
model of corporate governance with an extended agency capitalism model.  Although traditional 
agency costs between shareholders and managers have been mitigated through corporate laws that 
dictate the composition and duties of the board of directors, new agency costs have arisen between 
the various intermediaries in the investment chain.  Some of these are mitigated by trust laws but 
others will only be regulated through private contracts which can leave considerable room for self-
interested behaviour.  
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Figure 1 Agency theory and Agency Capitalism views of investor stewardship  
 
 
Universal ownership and stakeholder theory 
While agency capitalism takes into account modern investment chains and fiduciary duties, the 
theory of universal ownership deals specifically with the re-concentration of share ownership into 
the hands of institutional investors (Hawley and Williams, 2000a).  It argues that institutional 
investors hold such large and diverse portfolios that these holdings represent a cross-section of an 
entire economy.  They cannot escape market impacts by simply selling a few shares and thus they 
will have a natural interest in ‘universal monitoring’ (Hawley and Williams, 2002; Juravle and Lewis, 
2008; Kiernan, 2007; Lydenberg, 2007).  In other words, this theory predicts the opposite of agency 
capitalism, that these large institutional investors will find it more efficient to reduce risk by using 
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the strategy of ‘voice’ rather than ‘exit’. Indeed, the popularity of index investing, where investors 
commit to investing across an index, may actually prevent investors from using the strategy of exit 
and provide further incentive for universal monitoring.  Universal ownership theory predicts 
investors will find advantages in acting collectively as this increases their voice (Bebchuk et al., 
2017). It suggests that large institutional investors can be seen as stewards of a market or economy 
rather than of individual companies or funds. They may be more likely to focus their engagement 
around a particular economic issue than a particular company.  In a recent volume of this journal, 
Mees and Smith provide evidence of this re-concentration of shareholder power through industry 
associations that mediate collective action to influence the governance practices of investee 
companies (Mees and Smith, 2019). Mees and Smith also find that institutional investors have been 
increasingly exercising ‘voice’ not only around corporate financial performance and corporate 
governance but around issues of corporate responsibility or sustainability, also known as ESG 
(environmental, social and governance) factors (Kiernan, 2007; Mees and Smith, 2019: 82).   
The idea that corporations should be more socially responsible, by balancing the interests of all of 
their stakeholders (including employees, suppliers, customers and the environment) rather than 
focusing on the wealth of shareholders, has been embraced both theoretically (Freeman et al., 2004) 
and, to some extent, in corporate law (Keay, 2010; Keay, 2011). Stakeholder theory, applied 
primarily to corporate decision-making, now has a parallel at the investor level. As companies 
increasingly take account of environmental and social issues to demonstrate corporate social 
responsibility (CSR) or corporate sustainability, institutional investors increasingly take account of 
ESG factors to demonstrate responsible or sustainable investing (Katelouzou and Klettner, 2020; 
Majoch et al., 2017; Sparkes and Cowton, 2004) thereby supporting companies’ CSR efforts.  
Paradoxically, stakeholder theory, applied at the investor level, suggests that it is in the interests of 
shareholders, not to prioritise their own immediate financial interests, but to look to the long term 
and take an ‘enlightened’ view of shareholder value when making investment decisions, particularly 
when they are investing on behalf of others (Keay, 2011; Sandberg, 2011; Sandberg, 2013).  In this 
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scenario we might see investors as stewards of society, encouraging companies to balance the 
interests of a variety of stakeholders. Figure 2 demonstrates the way in which these two additional 
theories subtly alter the model of corporate governance by bringing in wider systemic or social 
concerns. 
Figure 2 Universal ownership and Stakeholder theory views of investor stewardship  
 
 
Research design and methodology  
Bearing in mind these potentially conflicting theoretical explanations of the role of institutional 
investors in corporate governance and their consequences for the meaning of investor stewardship, 
this paper’s objective is to investigate the practical approach recommended by policy-makers, as 
evidenced in stewardship codes. How do the drafters of stewardship codes (multi-stakeholder 
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groups from both industry and government) understand, frame and deal with current tensions in 
corporate governance theory and practice? The research undertaken is interpretive and qualitative 
in nature, seeking to discover collective frames of reference that guide the way industry 
stakeholders interpret the reality they inhabit (Isabella, 1990; Jamali et al., 2008).  Framing is a 
process often discussed in relation to public policy whereby actors impose a particular frame of 
reference on an issue through careful choice of language, labels and story-telling (Benford and Snow, 
2000; Daviter, 2007; Klüver et al., 2015). Stewardship codes, as soft law documents, represent a 
collective framing process by a mixed group of actors.  By analysing the intentions of these quasi-
policy makers the paper aims to provide ‘an intelligent basis for discussing and judging conflicting 
ideas, proposals, and outcomes’ (Fischer, 1995: 3).  Interpretive approaches to policy analysis focus 
on the meanings that policies have for a broad range of stakeholders as well as tensions and conflicts 
in meaning (Yanow, 2000). The tension for institutional investors is whether to act as a steward of 
investee companies, a steward of beneficiaries’ funds, a steward of the economy or a steward of 
wider society.  Or whether it is possible to find a successful combination of these aims. 
The sample of codes analysed for this research comprises all national stewardship codes published in 
English prior to the start of 2019 and currently in force.  For consistency, the database comprised 
only the most up-to-date versions of national stewardship codes and not regional or model 
stewardship codes.  Codes were included regardless of whether they were published by 
government, supervisory bodies or industry associations.  The final sample comprised nineteen 
stewardship codes as detailed in Table 1 including two from Australia (directed at different segments 
of the investment industry).  Using the issuer categories introduced by Cicon et al (2012) five codes 
were issued by government or regulatory authorities; one by a stock exchange; nine were issued by 
industry or professional associations; three by composite groups (including at least two of the 
previous groups) and the last by a private investment service provider.  Importantly, all stewardship 
codes were developed with the input of industry experts and none are mandatory in terms of 
requiring substantive changes to behaviour.  Some mandate disclosure of information but this is on a 
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‘comply or explain’ basis meaning that investors are free to explain their non-compliance with code 
principles of they feel strict compliance is inappropriate. 
Table 1 Research sample: stewardship codes in order of first publication  
 Country Code Title Code Date  Issuer Mechanism 
1.  United 
Kingdom 
The UK Stewardship Code 2012 (first 
published 
2010) 
Financial Reporting Council 
(regulator) 
Comply-or-explain 





Canadian Coalition for 
Good Governance (investor 
association) 
Voluntary  
3.  South Africa CRISA Code for Responsible 
Investing in South Africa 2011 
2011 Institute of Directors 
Southern Africa (directors 
association) 
Apply-or-explain 
4.  Netherlands Best practices for Engaged 
Share Ownership 
2011 Eumedion (investor 
association) 
Apply-or-explain 
5.  Switzerland Guidelines for institutional 
investors governing the 
exercising of participation 
rights in public limited 
companies 
2013 Collaboration of investor 
associations 
Comply-or-explain 





Financial Services Agency 
Council of Experts 
Concerning the Japanese 
Version of the Stewardship 
Code (regulator) 
Comply-or-explain 
7.  Malaysia Malaysian Code for 
Institutional Investors 
2014 Minority Shareholder 





8.  Italy Italian Stewardship Principles 
for the exercise of 
administrative and voting 







9.  Kenya Stewardship Code for 
Institutional Investors 
2015 Capital Markets Authority 
(regulator) 
Apply-or-explain 
10.  Hong Kong Principles of Responsible 
Ownership 
2016 Securities and Futures 
Commission (regulator) 
Voluntary 
11.  Taiwan Stewardship Principles for 
Institutional Investors 
2016 Taiwan Stock Exchange 
(market operator) 
Comply-or-explain 
12.  Brazil AMEC Stewardship Code 2016 Association of Capital 
Markets Investors (industry 
association) 
Voluntary 
13.  Denmark Stewardship Code 2016 The Committee on 
Corporate Governance 
(expert committee 
requested by government) 
Comply-or-explain 
14.  Singapore Singapore Stewardship 
Principles for Responsible 
Investors 
2016 Stewardship Asia (expert 
group) 
Voluntary 
15.  South Korea KCGS Stewardship Code 2016 Korean Corporate 
Governance Service (expert 
service provider) 
Voluntary 
16.  United 
States 
ISG Stewardship Framework 
for Institutional Investors 





17.  Thailand SEC Investment Governance 
Code for Institutional 
Investors 
2017 Securities and Exchange 
Commission (regulator) 
Comply-or-explain 
18.  Australia 
FSC 
Principles of Internal 
Governance and Asset 
Stewardship 
2017 Financial Services Council 
(FSC) (investor association) 
Comply or explain 
mandatory for 
members 
19.  Australia 
ACSI 
Australian Asset Owner 
Stewardship Code 





To explore the role of institutional investors promoted by stewardship codes, the text of each code 
was downloaded and entered into Nvivo, a computer-assisted qualitative data analysis software 
(CAQDAS) program for analysis.  The process of analysis followed common practice for analysing 
qualitative data including comparing and contrasting content as well as coding the data according to 
theoretical themes (Schreier, 2013; Tilba and McNulty, 2013).  Past studies of corporate governance 
codes have used a similar methodology (Collier and Zaman, 2005b; Heugens and Otten, 2007; 
Zattoni and Cuomo, 2008).  The theoretical framework used to code the data is described in Table 2.  
Based on the literature review, the table summarises the key assumptions of four theories and the 
corresponding role predicted for institutional investors.  The text of all stewardship codes was coded 
in units of one sentence, identifying all sentences that corresponded with one or more of the four 
theories.  Duplicated text was only counted once (for example, lists of contents were not counted). 
Sentences were coded on the basis of meaning and not simply on the basis of keywords.  Both the 
author and a research assistant coded the data and any coding differences were resolved through 
detailed discussion.   
 
Table 2 Theoretical Framework  
Agency theory  
Assumptions Corresponding role for 
institutional investors 
Coding examples 
Agency costs (between 
principal-shareholders and 
agent-managers) can be 
reduced by monitoring and 
alignment of interests (Fama 
and Jensen, 1983; Ryan and 
Schneider, 2003) 
Investors act as stewards of the 
corporation.  
 
Investors will act as monitors – 
ensuring, through the board of 
directors & remuneration 
schemes, that company 
Sentences referring to monitoring 
investee companies, engaging with 
companies, enhancing value of 
companies, e.g: 
 
‘While the board of directors oversees 




Outcomes are measured 
financially e.g. through 
maximising shareholder value 
(Clarke, 2014; Ryan and 
Schneider, 2003) 
management runs the company 
in their interests 
 
Those interests are primarily 
financial meaning that investors 
act to improve firm financial 
performance. 
 
significant role in corporate 
governance in overseeing that the 
board fulfills its responsibilities’ 
(Canada, p1) 
 
‘Regular interaction with investee 
listed issuers can help to protect and 
guarantee value in the long-term’ 
(Italy p16) 
Agency capitalism 
Assumptions Corresponding role for 
institutional investors 
Coding examples 
Another significant agency 
relationship exists between 
shareholders and beneficial 
owners (Bebchuk et al., 2017; 
Gilson and Gordon, 2013) 
 
Business models and 
increasingly long investment 
chains limit incentives and 
capacity to monitor portfolio 
companies other than through 
share price (Gilson and Gordon, 
2013) 
Investors act as stewards of 
specific funds. 
 
Most large investors are 
fiduciaries taking care of the 
funds of beneficiaries 
 
These investors may act as 
traders rather than owners 
using exit rather than voice to 
improve fund financial 
performance. 
Sentences referring to clients, 
beneficiaries, funds, fiduciary duties, 
investment chain, outsourcing, 
mandates, e.g: 
 
‘An investor investing funds on behalf 
of clients has a duty to act in the 
interests of its clients and/or the 
beneficiaries of the funds provided by 
its clients’ (Hong Kong p6) 
 
‘The ultimate responsibility for the 
exercise of stewardship activities 
remains with the investor, regardless 
of whether certain activities are 
outsourced’ (Denmark p 6) 
Universal ownership 
Assumptions Corresponding role for 
institutional investors 
Coding examples 
Due to their size and dispersed 
portfolio of investments, 
institutional investors will be 
concerned not with individual 
company performance but of 
the economy/market as a 
whole (Hawley and Williams 
2000a; Lydenberg, 2007). 
 
Monitoring costs can be 
reduced by investors acting 
collaboratively (Bebchuk et al., 
2017) 
Investors act as stewards of a 
market or economy 
 
Large investors cannot act as 
traders as they are invested in 
the whole economy and will use 
voice rather than exit. 
 
To increase their voice, 
institutional investors may act 
collaboratively.  
Sentences referring to the wider 
economy or market, the power and 
influence of investors within that 
market, including through collective 
engagement, e.g: 
 
‘Institutional investors are major 
players in the global economy who 
can exert significant influence over 
their investee companies due to the 
substantial stake they hold’ (Malaysia, 
p3). 
 
It may be appropriate to carry out 
collective engagements, for example, 
in the case of significant corporate 
events or issues of public interest 
(such as serious economic or sectoral 
crises)’ (Italy p 17) 
Stakeholder theory 





Taking the interests of all 
stakeholders into account leads 
to sustainable value creation 
(Freeman et al., 2004). 
 
Some stakeholders may be 
more salient than others in 
their claims on the firm at 
different times (Mitchell et al., 
1997). 
Investors act as stewards of 
society/the planet. 
 
Investors will encourage 
companies to mediate different 
stakeholder interests by taking 
a long-term view of value and 
incorporating social and 
environmental factors. 
 
Different types of investors may 
agitate for specific 
environmental or social 
changes. 
Sentences referring to stakeholders 
(other than shareholders), 
sustainability and ESG issues, e.g: 
 
‘It is no longer appropriate for 
institutional investors to focus on only 
monetary benefit to the ultimate 
beneficiaries of investments to the 
exclusion of factors that impact on 
long-term sustainability’ (South Africa 
p7) 
 
‘Investment decisions should take into 
consideration the commitment of 
Investee Companies to ESG 
principles…’ (Thailand p11) 
 
 
Findings and discussion  
Table 3 reveals that an agency theory interpretation of the role of institutional investors is reflected 
most strongly across all codes in terms of the collective total number of references (345), with 
agency capitalism slightly less dominant (330).  However, if codes are grouped based on the 
strongest theory per code (shaded in grey) the opposite is found: there are slightly more codes with 
agency capitalism as their strongest theme (nine codes) than there are with agency theory as their 
strongest theme (eight codes).  For South Korea the two themes were of equal prominence and the 
South African code was the only one with a different theory, stakeholder theory, most prominent.  
The fourth theory, universal ownership, was not heavily reflected in any code, although all codes 
(except Switzerland) referred at least briefly to the advantages of collective ownership and/or the 
ability of institutional investors to influence companies and the economy as a whole.  Although this 
theory was not easy to pick up in the specific recommendations of the codes, its theme of using 
voice (engagement and dialogue) rather than exit (selling shares) is implied in the overall concept of 






Table 3 Stewardship codes’ interpretation of the role of institutional investors 





per code  
Australia 
ACSI 7 13% 21 40% 17 32% 8 15% 53 
Australia FSC 11 35% 18 58% 1 3% 1 3% 31 
Brazil 9 23% 12 31% 9 23% 9 23% 39 
Canada 26 42% 25 40% 4 6% 7 11% 62 
Denmark  16 67% 4 17% 2 8% 2 8% 24 
Hong Kong 10 32% 15 48% 2 6% 4 13% 31 
Italy 27 60% 12 27% 2 4% 4 9% 45 
Japan 2014 19 49% 18 46% 1 3% 1 3% 39 
Kenya  42 51% 18 22% 15 18% 7 9% 82 
Korea  24 48% 24 48% 0 0% 2 4% 50 
Malaysia 23 34% 31 46% 10 15% 3 4% 67 
Netherlands 17 50% 7 21% 6 18% 4 12% 34 
Singapore 20 48% 13 31% 3 7% 6 14% 42 
South Africa 14 25% 15 27% 23 41% 4 7% 56 
Switzerland 6 27% 15 68% 1 5% 0 0% 22 
Taiwan 15 34% 25 57% 1 2% 3 7% 44 
Thailand 29 38% 22 29% 18 24% 7 9% 76 
UK 2012 21 39% 24 44% 1 2% 8 15% 54 
US 9 41% 11 50% 0 0% 2 9% 22 
Collective 
Totals per 
theory 345 40% 330 38% 116 13% 82 9% 873 
 
Similarities across codes 
Although initially introduced to deal with the classic agency theory problem of lack of monitoring of 
corporate management, (Cheffins, 2010; Chiu, 2012a) stewardship codes, as a whole, recognise that 
new agency problems within the investment chain, explained by agency capitalism theory, (Gilson 
and Gordon, 2013) also need to be addressed.  Stewardship codes show that these two theories can 
be complementary, rather than conflicting, but that classic agency theory applied to institutional 
investors does not make practical sense alone: we also need to understand and deal with the 
modern agency costs inherent in the financial chain from fund beneficiary, to asset owner, through 
asset managers to the investment in a listed company.  Until now corporate governance frameworks 
have not recognised the importance of these additional relationships to the functioning of the 
overall system (Bebchuk et al., 2017).   
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Of course, these agency relationships within the investment chain have not gone entirely unnoticed.  
Legal systems have long dealt with the agency relationship between fund beneficiaries and asset 
owners by imposing fiduciary duties upon fund trustees (Sandberg, 2013). Fiduciary duties recognise 
the fact that institutional investors are managing money that ultimately belongs to someone else 
and thus they must place the best interests of the actual owners above their own interests 
(Sandberg, 2011).  Thus many codes place investors primarily as stewards of funds and only 
indirectly as stewards of corporations.  As the Canadian code states, ‘Stewardship for institutional 
investors means fulfilling their responsibilities as fiduciaries in meeting their obligations to 
beneficiaries or clients’.   
Stewardship codes recognise the costs of agency capitalism and attempt to resolve the problem by 
using investors’ legal duties to their clients and beneficiaries as an incentive to monitor both 
investee companies (in accordance with classic agency theory) and also any financial intermediaries 
who may otherwise distort or reduce the incentives to monitor.  Indeed, stewardship codes have 
cleverly leveraged these legal duties to encourage monitoring throughout the investment chain. As 
the Hong Kong code states, ‘Owners of company equity should not blindly delegate these 
responsibilities. Even when they employ agents, directly or indirectly, to act on their behalf, owners 
should ensure that their ownership responsibilities are appropriately discharged by those agents’.  
The implications of this extended agency capitalism model of corporate governance for both 
managerial practice and corporate governance theory are extensive.  In theory it places much of civil 
society (those of us with money in savings or pension funds) in a position to influence corporate 
governance (Raelin and Bondy, 2013).  This is one reason why stakeholder theory has potential to 
enter the equation.  It would seem paradoxical to suggest that investors as shareholders would want 
to challenge their own primacy in corporate governance.  But if those investors are representatives 
of broader society this begins to make more sense and permits wider stakeholder interests to be 
considered (Kiernan, 2007).  It may permit the return of legal concepts such as fairness, justice and 
reasonableness into the finance system providing a much needed counter-weight to the recent 
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economic focus on rational, efficient value-maximisation (Lydenberg, 2014). Stewardship codes may 
have the effect of introducing more accountability and public interest into the fulfilment of fiduciary 
duties (Chiu, 2012b).   
Differences across codes 
Table 3 also shows that a stakeholder theory interpretation of the role of institutional investors is 
dominant in only a small number of codes.  Stakeholder theory is reflected more strongly than 
agency theory in only two codes (South Africa and Australia ACSI) and is equal with agency theory in 
the Brazilian code.  Other codes with above average focus on stakeholder theory and ESG include 
Thailand, Kenya, the Netherlands and Malaysia.  Future research will hopefully further unpack and 
explain these cross-country differences, perhaps based on institutional factors or varieties of 
capitalism theories.  However, stewardship codes hint that theories of political economy may also 
provide a helpful lens through which to view differences in countries’ approaches to investor 
stewardship.  The introduction to the Malaysian code refers to Malaysia’s vision of becoming a high-
income nation exhibiting inclusiveness and sustainability whereas the Australian (ACSI) code refers 
to recent increased demand for sustainable business. It seems that encouraging sustainability can be 
part of a wider policy objective of attracting foreign investment and/or countering social or 
environmental problems.  For example, South Africa began its focus on responsible investing during 
the boycotts of the Apartheid years, (Naqvi, 2019) whereas Thailand has been forging ahead with 
ESG as a way to demonstrate its efforts to curb human trafficking, grow sustainable fisheries and 
stem corruption (Zembrowski, 2019).  The Thailand stock exchange positions good ESG disclosures as 
a competitive advantage and a way to attract foreign investors and is now ranked number 7 in the 
world when it comes to sustainability disclosure regimes (Zembrowski, 2019).  The Capital Market 
Authority in Kenya and the Nairobi Securities Exchange recently joined the UN Sustainable Stock 
Exchanges initiative explaining that they seek to build trust in Kenya and help responsible companies 
attract investors (SSE, 2019).  Theories of political economy might help to explain different policy 
21 
 
approaches to corporate governance that are not easily related to prevailing corporate governance 
models or ownership structures (Aguilera and Crespi-Cladera, 2016; Veldman and Willmott, 2016).   
Even codes with a high agency theory focus are not silent on wider stakeholders and ESG, they just 
approach the issue from a different perspective.  They place ESG within the large basket of factors 
that can impact on corporate value.  For example the Singapore code considers that to ‘meet the 
aims of long-term value creation, capital efficiency and sustainable growth’, investors should 
‘engage with their investee companies on a full spectrum of topics, including strategy, long-term 
performance, risk, financials, culture, remuneration, social and environmental considerations and 
corporate governance’.  The Kenyan code states, ‘In the investment context, the main focus of 
institutional investors is on those aspects of social, environmental and ethical practice by issuers that 
may pose a material commercial risk or opportunity’.  These statements can be seen to reflect an 
‘enlightened shareholder value’ view of corporate governance as a way of integrating the economics 
of agency theory with the social benefits of stakeholder theory (Jensen, 2002; Keay, 2011; Keay, 
2012; Queen, 2015).   
Typology of stewardship codes 
Table 4 together with Figure 3 suggests a typology of stewardship codes based on the data. The first 
category in the typology comprises the codes with a high focus on both agency theory and agency 
capitalism, found in the middle of the graph.  This category includes codes in highly developed 
financial markets: the UK, US, Canada, Hong Kong, South Korea and Japan.  It may be that these are 
countries where the presence of complex investment chains is common, skewing incentives for 
traditional monitoring of listed companies.  These codes are directed at resolving those skewed 
incentives by recognising and integrating the investment chain into corporate governance 
monitoring processes.  Many of these codes, like those in category two below, are issued by 
organisations that also publish the country’s corporate governance code. In these countries, 
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investors are being asked to be stewards of both the companies they invest in and the funds they 
manage, with stewardship codes focusing on a win-win situation for both. 
Table 4: Typology of stewardship codes  
1. High Agency and High Agency Capitalism 2. High Agency, Low Agency Capitalism 
UK, US, Canada, Hong Kong, Japan, South Korea, 
Malaysia 
Denmark, Italy, Kenya, Netherlands, Singapore 
Progressive view of importance of investment chain 
in improving corporate governance 
Stewards of both investee companies and 
beneficiaries’ funds 
Traditional view of improving corporate governance 
Stewards of investee companies 
3. Low Agency and High Agency Capitalism,  4. Low Agency and Low Agency Capitalism  
(High Stakeholder) 
Switzerland, Taiwan, Australia FSC Australia ACSI, Brazil, South Africa, Thailand 
Stewardship codes with a focus on 
beneficiaries/clients rather than corporations 
Stewards of beneficiaries’ funds  
Progressive view of fiduciary duties that encourages 
incorporation of ESG factors 
Stewards of society. 
 



































































The second category, clustered at the bottom right of the graph, are the codes with a dominant 
agency theory focus where investors are framed primarily as monitors of corporate performance.  
These codes focus on the relationship between investors and companies and spend less time 
exploring agency problems in the investment chain.  It is interesting that several of these codes have 
been introduced as companions to a corporate governance code.  For example, the Danish code is 
issued by the Committee on Corporate Governance and aims to reinforce the Recommendations on 
Corporate Governance ‘to promote the companies’ long-term value creation and thereby contribute 
to maximising long-term return for investors’.  The Kenyan code is also partnered closely with the 
country’s code of corporate governance and designed specifically to help in assessing compliance 
with this code, ‘monitoring of this nature is essential if the ‘apply or explain’ Code of Corporate 
Governance is to have impact’.  Another feature of some of the codes in this category is that they 
highlight specific governance issues in the local market.  For example, the Italian code mentions that 
‘the presence of independent minority members of the corporate bodies of investee listed issuers 
can serve as a method of monitoring’.  The Kenyan code refers to controlling foreign ownership by 
multinationals and ‘balancing the interests of the global multinational with the interests of minority 
shareholders’.  Thus their focus on investors as governance monitors might be explained by local 
share ownership patterns and market-specific governance problems.  The Dutch code refers to other 
best practice provisions for institutional investors found in the Dutch corporate governance code.  
Thus, in a national context, the focus of a stewardship code may be determined by gaps that need to 
be filled in a wider regulatory framework: if agency relationships and fiduciary duties are dealt with 
elsewhere, the code may not need to mention them. 
Category three, at the top of the graph, includes codes where the focus on agency capitalism is 
stronger than on agency theory.  These include the Australian FSC code, Switzerland and Taiwan.  
Again, this might be explained by the nature of the issuers of these codes.  The Australian FSC code is 
directed at asset managers only, so focused on participants within the investment chain and aimed 
at improving the domestic financial services industry, with a strong emphasis on the internal 
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governance of asset managers.  The Taiwanese code is issued by the stock exchange, so is an 
organisation very much aware of the realities of the local market.  The Swiss code is issued by a 
collaboration of investor associations.  These organisations will be most concerned with investors’ 
fiduciary duties to their clients and beneficiaries. 
Lastly, category four comprises the codes, mentioned above, that have the strongest stakeholder 
theory interpretations of the role of institutional investors.  These codes tend to be low on agency 
theory and relatively low on agency capitalism, yet they do still have something to say on 
stewardship of beneficiaries’ funds.  They promote an interpretation of fiduciary duty that 
encourages a long-term perspective of investment incorporating environmental, social and 
governance (ESG) factors.  For example, the Brazilian code states, ‘by carefully managing the assets 
of their end beneficiaries, institutional investors should consider relevant ESG factors as crucial 
aspects when it comes to the fulfilment of their fiduciary duty’.  It can be argued that they place 
investors as stewards of wider society and the environment.  Indeed, across the world, there has 
been a long-running debate over the extent to which investors’ fiduciary duties permit them to 
incorporate ESG factors (Richardson 2009; Sandberg 2011; Sandberg 2013).  This debate revolves 
around the meaning of ‘the best interests of beneficiaries’.  In many jurisdictions this phrase was 
traditionally interpreted as meaning the best financial interests of beneficiaries and, in some, it was 
equated to a duty to maximise investment returns.  Although this debate has now been mostly 
resolved to permit the taking into account of ESG factors, (Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer 2005; PRI 
2015) local rules and customs around the scope and interpretation of fiduciary duties could explain 
differences across countries.   
Limitations and future research  
This research studies the content of stewardship codes rather than the antecedents, implementation 
or outcomes of stewardship codes. Its aim is to advance understanding of the theoretical 
foundations of the policy of investor stewardship and the way codes endeavour to reconcile 
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inherent tensions in the role of institutional investors. Hopefully the typology presented here will 
provide a framework for future international comparative research exploring the reasons behind 
national differences.  Potential approaches to exploring and explaining cross-country variation might 
include use of theories of political economy; varieties of capitalism; share ownership structures; 
code issuer identity; as well as prevailing corporate governance models. The way in which codes 
recognise and deal with the heterogeneity of investors is also interesting and the theoretical 
leanings of a code may reflect the predominant type of investor in that market. 
There is also great scope for research into the impact of the investment chain on corporate 
governance and development of the agency capitalism corporate governance model. Transmission 
of responsible investment mandates, as recommended by stewardship codes, may be effective 
when the investment chain is relatively simple but will become extremely difficult in circumstances 
where structured financial products twist the purpose of share ownership into something entirely 
different.  Many codes recognise this limitation, providing loopholes and narrowing the code’s 
influence to those investors already using strategies of long-term ownership.  Research that takes 
into account the heterogeneity of shareholders and their strategies is needed to determine the 
proportion of any market likely to behave as each of the four types of stewards.  
Conclusion 
Significant changes in share ownership over recent years have placed institutional shareholders in a 
powerful position, altering the dynamics of corporate governance and challenging existing 
theoretical models.  Institutional investors are well placed to engage with corporate leaders and 
monitor investee companies yet do not always do so, leaving a gap in the market-based 
enforcement of good governance (Cheffins, 2010; Chiu, 2012a).  Stewardship codes provide 
evidence of the industry response to these contemporary governance problems, attempting to 
redefine the role of institutional investors in corporate governance.  They help us to understand the 
conflicts faced by institutional investors both in a practical and theoretical sense and how these 
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might be resolved.  This research explores whether institutional investors should act primarily as 
stewards of their investee companies (agency theory), stewards of beneficiaries’ funds (agency 
capitalism), stewards of a market/economy (universal ownership) or stewards of society 
(stakeholder theory). Of course, the answer is that they can try to do all of these things but their 
primary focus will be directed by local laws, regulation, markets and institutions including the issuers 
of stewardship codes.   
This analysis of stewardship codes across the world reveals collective recognition of the importance 
of the modern investment chain in corporate governance and the additional agency costs that it 
creates.  To tackle these extended agency costs, stewardship codes draw on the fiduciary duties 
imposed upon institutional investors, using these as an incentive to monitor and control agents 
throughout the chain.  Thus the role of an institutional investor is primarily as a steward of funds 
which then indirectly incorporates the role of steward of investee corporations.  In other words, to 
protect and grow their funds, investors must monitor corporate performance.  However, some 
codes veer away from the shareholder-centric view of corporate governance, bringing in elements of 
stakeholder theory and universal ownership to justify consideration of wider societal or economic 
concerns over the long-term.  This has important implications for management in terms of defining 
the purpose of the corporation and finding an acceptable balance between the pursuit of 
shareholder value and the interests of wider stakeholders.  Increasing global interest in improving 
the sustainability of financial systems is only likely to push stewardship codes further towards 
stakeholder theory concepts and integration of ESG (Katelouzou and Klettner, 2020).  Indeed, the 
2020 versions of both the UK and Japanese codes have increased emphasis on ESG, possibly altering 
their position in the typology of codes above.  If collective action becomes more commonplace, as it 
is beginning to in some countries, (Mees and Smith, 2019) we might see institutional investors as 
stewards of the economy more widely following the theory of universal ownership (Hawley and 
Williams, 2002).  As a whole, stewardship codes try to balance the tensions inherent in the role of 
institutional investors, encouraging them to consider long-term corporate purpose using 
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collaborative engagement rather than pursuit of short-term shareholder value through competitive 
trading. 
Capital markets and the investment industry have changed significantly over recent decades and 
governance theory and institutional frameworks are struggling to catch up.  We may be on the verge 
of a new paradigm for corporate governance involving a system-wide perspective, (Hawley and 
Lukomnik, 2018); integration of corporate sustainability, (Klettner et al., 2014) and new legal 
approaches that bring back concepts of fairness and equity to balance the recent over-reliance on 
economic rationality (Jacobs, 2012; Lydenberg, 2014). 
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